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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the role of firm heterogeneity under credit
constraints for economic growth. We focus on firm size, innovativeness and
credit constraints in a semi-endogenous growth model reflecting recent empirical
findings on firm heterogeneity. It allows for an explicit solution for transitional
growth and balanced growth path productivity as well as the growth maximizing
firm heterogeneity. This enables us to draw inference about the impact of key
policy parameters of the model on these quantities and to draw conclusions
about firm and capital market related policies.
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1 Introduction
In the recent past new data sets have allowed researchers to detect systematic rela-
tions between the characteristics of business firms and their participation in foreign
trade and investment. This has spurred an increasing number of theoretical contri-
butions that consider the influence of firm heterogeneity on the pattern of foreign
trade and international economic integration. For the empirical evidence on the
differences between firms that participate in foreign trade and those that do not,
see Bernard et al. (2007). Helpman (2006) reviews the main theoretical lines along
which current contributions try to explain these findings. Recently also development
studies (e.g. Bond et al. 2008 or Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer 2010) and labor mar-
ket studies (e.g. Helpman et al. 2008 or Yeaple 2005) are taking firm heterogeneity
into account. Less attention has been paid to possible links between firm hetero-
geneity and other key economic variables, as, for instance, aggregate productivity or
growth although data demonstrate that small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)
are responsible for a considerable share in aggregate output and employment.
The focus of this paper is the link between firm size, research and development
(R&D), economic growth and long-run productivity in the presence of credit con-
straints for SMEs on theoretical grounds. To motivate this, we first look at what
the existing empirical evidence can tell us about the key mechanisms underlying this
relationship. This reveals that there is a tendency for smaller firms to be more inno-
vative than larger ones. However, recent developments in capital market regulations
(Basel II) point to a disadvantage for smaller firms in getting the necessary finan-
cial leverage. Furthermore, bank surveys indicate that negative shocks on capital
markets as e.g. the recent financial crises worsen this disadvantage even more.
The contribution of the present paper to the literature is twofold. First, we
develop a semi-endogenous growth model taking account of the influence of firm
heterogeneity in innovativeness and credit constraints for SMEs. To the best of our
knowledge this hasn’t been done before in the literature1. From this model we are
1Peretto (1998, 1999a,b) is concerned with firm size but only for homogenous firms. Luttmer
(2007) and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) analyze the relation between heterogeneity in firm
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able to obtain an explicit expression of the optimal degree of firm heterogeneity
regarding growth and long-run productivity. The study that comes closest to what
we have in mind when considering the link between firm size and growth is Klette
and Kortum (2004). However, it takes not account of heterogeneity in innovativeness
of firms.
Second, using the results from our model we are able to perform comparative
statics on both transitional growth and productivity on the balanced growth path
of the economy. This is done with respect to parameters reflecting heterogeneity
in credit constraints and innovativeness of firms. Doing so enables us to draw con-
clusions on how the optimal degree of firm heterogeneity is influenced by policies
affecting these parameters and what effects policy interventions have on growth
and productivity. We can draw general qualitative conclusions how effectiveness of
policies is influenced by the existing degree of heterogeneity in an economy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview about the
available empirical evidence on firm heterogeneity, innovativeness and credit con-
straints and motivates our theoretical approach. The model is developed in Section
3 and its results are discussed in Section 4 where we also deduct implications for
evaluating the recent EU policy initiatives targeted at SMEs. In Section 5 we finally
conclude.
2 Empirical Findings
The importance of SMEs for an economy is generally judged as very high (see e.g.
OECD 2009) . This is of course due to their dominance in numbers as compared
to large scale enterprises. The German federal bureau for statistics (Statistisches
Bundesamt) recently released interesting figures for the German economy in 2005.2
The study considers the role of small and medium sized enterprises with up to 250
employees and turnover up to 50 m e per year or a balance sheet of up to 43
m e in manufacturing, retail trade, hotel and restaurant industries, transportation,
level productivity and aggregate productivity
2See Klees and Veldhues (2008)
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telecommunication and partly the service sector so that about 80% of all German
enterprises are covered. It reveals that 99% of all enterprises belong to the SME
sector, they are responsible for 60% of total employment, 35% of total turnover, 40%
of all gross investments in structures and 46% of total gross value added. Therefore,
it is unsurprising that the SME sector plays so prominent a role in the economic
policy debate.3
In other industrialized countries the SME sector is on average even more impor-
tant. In 2003 the world bank released a data base that provides mean values for the
time period 1990 to 1999.4 Extracting the data for the 30 OECD member countries,
which build a relevant comparison group for the German economy, reveals that the
OECD mean share of SMEs in total employment and value added is 66% and 49%,
respectively. The figures for Germany during that period of time are 60% and 43%.
Not directly related to the SME sector but nevertheless interesting in this context
is entrepreneurship measured by the fraction of the population aged between 18 and
64 active in running a business. The EIM5 provides in its Entrepreneurs international
(Compendia) data set time series on this measure for 23 OECD countries for 1972
to 20076. This entrepreneurial measure declined during this period in 16 of these
countries. The unweighted average decline amounts to 3.7 percentage points while
the average value 1972 was 17.1%. Since entrepreneurship is closely related to SME
activity 7, these figures document a clear movement away from the SME sector to
an economy governed by larger companies. We should be concerned with this trend,
if firm size matters for economic growth. And, indeed, empirical evidence seems to
confirm this conjecture.
Pagano and Schivardi (2003) analyze the impact of the firm size distribution on
3See Dannreuther (2007) for the European Union SME policy in general and Jousten (2007) for
the taxation of SMEs in particular.
4See Ayyagari et al. (2007)
5http://www.entrepreneurship-eu.eu
6The 23 countries cover Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands, U.K. and U.S..
7According to Audretsch (2007) today’s entrepreneurship yields tomorrow’s SMEs.
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the growth of labor productivity. In their sectoral study for European countries they
find a positive relationship between the concentration of a sector on fewer and larger
firms on the one side and higher labor productivity growth on the other side.
Carree and Thurik (1998) come to an opposite result. In their study, they inves-
tigate the consequences of the transformation process in Europe´s manufacturing
industries, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, from large firms toward
small firms. Based on a panel-sample of 14 manufacturing industries in 13 European
countries they find, on average, that the employment share of relative large firms
has a negative impact on output growth. Audretsch and Thurik (2001), in a recent
contribution, underpin this result: In their panel study for European countries they
find that a concentration towards smaller firms positively affects growth.
Other studies indicate severe differences in the activities of firms of different scale
or size with respect to innovations, the driving force of economic growth. Lotti and
Schivardi (2005) study the patenting behavior of countries, sectors and firms. They
match data of the European Patent Office with the firm level data base AMADEUS
(Bureau van Dijk) and find that the probability of patenting rises with firm size,
which is not quite surprising. The patenting intensity, i.e. granted patents relative
to employment, however, falls with employment. Equating innovative behavior with
patenting behavior, the relevance of firm size heterogeneity immediately surfaces.
Yet, there are also different results in the empirical literature. In a firm level
analysis Bertschek and Entorf (1996) find a non linear relationship between inno-
vating behavior and firm size. For Germany the relationship depends on the time
period considered. Their cross sectional regression with data from 1984 reveals that
small and large enterprises are more innovative than medium sized, whereas the
same regression with data from 1989 detects that medium sized enterprises are most
innovative. For the Belgian economy Bertschek and Entorf (1996) discover a similar
pattern as found by Lotti and Schivardi (2005). Acs and Audretsch (1990), Bound
et al. (1984), Cremer and Sirbu (1978) and Entorf (1988) provide further results
that support the non linear hypothesis for the relationship between firm size and
innovative behavior.
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Directly relevant to these findings are the recent developments in credit markets,
in particular the Advanced Internal Ratings-Based (A-IRB) approach of the Basel
II reforms. They lead, besides a more restrictive credit allocation, to higher credit
costs for SMEs. Grunert et al. (2002) estimate this mark-up for SMEs to be in the
range of 1 to 2.5 percentage points p. a. as compared to large scale companies.
Financing constraints are crucial for the R&D sector, since revenues for an R&D
project usually occur in the future while costs have to be covered today.
The reason for this can probably be found in the impact of the Basel II reforms
on the capital requirements for banks providing credits to SMEs. There is now
an increasing number of studies pointing in this direction. Empirical evidence for
increasing capital requirements and, hence, increasing refinancing costs can be found
in, e.g., Saurina and Trucharte (2004), Altman and Sabato (2005), Jacobson, Linde´
and Roszbach (2005) and Berger (2006). Meanwhile, there is evidence that the
requirements for banks are tightened further in response to the recent financial
crisis (see BIS 2009).
This argument gains in importance since it seems that SMEs are more heavily
affected by negative shocks to the capital market. The Bank Lending Survey (BLS)
conducted quarterly by the Eurosystem in the Euro area sheds some light on how
credit constraints apply to different type of firms. The survey is conducted since
2003 and covers 90 bank groups in all participating countries. Although limited in
detail, the reported numbers in the BLS can give insights on the influence of firm
size on credit constraints. During the fourth quarter 2008 (see ECB 2009 p. 17), i.e.
right after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the credit standards
applicable for approval of credits or credit lines tightened considerably more for
SMEs than for large firms. The percentage point difference of banks reporting
tightening standards over banks reporting easing standards due to general economic
risks increased for SMEs by 16 and for large firms by 5. For reasons of industry or
firm related outlook the numbers where 12 and 2, and for risk of the collateral 12
and 5. It seems therefore that conditions for SMEs detoriated considerably more
due to economic risks. But also increased refinancing costs of the lending banks hit
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SMEs harder than large firms. The percentage point difference of banks tightening
and banks easing standards due to refinancing costs increased for SMEs on average
by 8 and for large firms only by 3.7 points. The increasing finance problems for
SMEs in response to the financial crises have also been recognized at the OECD
Turin Round Table Meeting (see OECD 2009).
Taking these arguments together, we are tempted to conclude that, first, there
is a trade-off between the comparative advantage of SMEs in innovation and a com-
parative disadvantage in accessing financial leverage. Mata (1996) finds that the
majority of young firms, which are typically small, are established below their de-
sired or optimal firm size, mainly due to financial constraints but further due to sunk
costs combined with ability constraints of their founders, which are directly linked
to human capital, and which is particularly required for developing new ideas. The
author concludes that the higher the degree of human capital is, the more efficient
a company will be and this will increase firm size towards an optimal level. Sec-
ond, there might be a tendency in important OECD countries to move away from
SMEs towards an economy shaped by large enterprises, particularly when economics
of scale matters, as stated by Mata and Machado (1996) for instance. While Au-
dretsch and Thurik (2001) and Mata (1996) conjecture a optimal size of the SME
sector, the latter raises the question whether a decreasing size of the SME sector is
beneficial or not.
3 A Theoretical Model of Firm Heterogeneity and Growth
We consider a second generation growth model and follow Jones (1995) who assumes
a production function for innovations or new blueprints8. While this function is
identical for all firms engaged in R&D in Jones (1995), we introduce a heterogeneity
parameter δ that accounts for a size effect.
We assume that the population of firms active in R&D is distributed according
8For a discussion of different types of growth models and their appropriateness see also Jones
(1999, 2005)
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to
h(δ) = (k + 1)δk, k ≥ −1 (1)
on [δ, 1] so that the mass of firms equals 1 − δk+1. Our derivations below will
always consider the limiting case δ → 0, i.e., a unit mass of active R&D firms.9 The
distribution (1) is similar to the Pareto style distribution introduced by Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2007).10 The parameter k clearly shapes the distribution, which is
only meaningful for k > −1. In the following low values for δ will be associated with
small and medium sized firms in the R&D sector, while large δ characterizes large
sale firms. For k < 0 the distribution is skewed to relatively more small firms, for
k > 0 we have relatively more large scale firms.
The production function for firm δ ∈ [δ, 1] for new blueprints is given by11
A˙δ = δ
−αAφLλδ , (2)
where A˙δ denotes new blueprints produced by the firm. A is the economy wide
stock of blueprints and Lδ is the amount of R&D labor employed by the firm.
φ < 1, λ < 1 and α > 0 are productivity parameters. Time is continuous and all
variables correspond to the current time t if not stated otherwise. The total number
of blueprints discovered in a particular instance in time is obtained after aggregating
all A˙δ, i.e. A˙ =
∫
A˙δf(A˙δ)dδ, where f(A˙δ) denotes the density function for A˙δ. Total
employment in R&D which equals the total exogenous R&D labor supply is defined
analogously, L =
∫
Lδg(Lδ)dδ, where g(Lδ) denotes the corresponding density for
employment.
We interpret the new blueprints as unique ideas to produce differentiated inter-
mediate input factors which are used as an input to final goods production. We
therefore follow most of the contributions to the new growth literature which utilize
9The function that we will have to integrate below is continuous except at δ = 0. Yet, it is well
known that the Rieman integral of a function that is continuous on [a, b] except at finitely many
points exists. See, e.g., Capin´ski and Kopp (2004), p. 9.
10For empirical evidence in favor of a Pareto distribution for firm size see, e.g., Luttmer (2007).
11We treat time as continuous and whenever no confusion can arise the time index will be dropped
in the following. x˙ denotes ∂x
∂t
.
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a love of variety approach in producing final goods with a set of intermediate input
factors. Growth in the set of available intermediate input factors motivates growth
through a positive externality. However, we do not model explicitly these sectors of
the economy as this is not necessary for out results. We rather assume in accordance
with the literature that a firm after having created a new blueprint can license for
an infinite time horizon its particular variant to the intermediate sector and extracts
its flow profits piδ in exchange. In addition, we assume as usual that variants are
symmetric so that profits for every variant are identical piδ = pi ∀δ ∈ [δ, 1].
R&D firms must pay their workers in advance. We assume a sector of financial
intermediaries or banks who raise funds from the household sector and lend to R&D
firms at a common rate r. The present value of the flow of profits over the interval
[t,∞) is, then, given by:
V =
∫ ∞
t
pise
− ∫ st r(τ)dτds.
The wage rate w paid to each worker equals the marginal product of labor, which,
in turn, equals the marginal product of producing additional blueprints λAφLλ−1δ ,
times the present value of an additional blueprint V :
w = λδ−αAφLλ−1δ V
Thus, the wage bill that accrues to each newly produced blueprint is given by
wLδ
A˙
= λV.
Without any fixed costs of raising funds, the dividends d paid to the shareholders
equal
d = pi − rλV, (3)
where we assume that the firms have to pay back their loans at the end of each period.
Thus, while firms are different with regard to their ability to produce blueprints, they
produce the same dividend stream so that there is no incentive for shareholders to
trade stocks. We will now introduce fixed costs of raising funds that maintain this
property of the model.
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We assume higher costs of monitoring loans to smaller firms that are a fraction
1− δγ , γ > 0 of the firm’s credit requirement λV . These costs are meant to reflect
the credit constraints and financial disadvantages that smaller firms are faced with
as explained in Section 2. Both the wage bill and the fixed costs of the credit have
to be paid immediately and must be recovered by future profit flows so that
λV =
∫ ∞
t
λpie−
∫ s
t r(τ)dτds.
For this to hold, the firm must shift the burden of the monitoring costs on its workers
so that wages paid per patent shrink to δγλV . Since both parts of the credit have
to be remunerated with the common interest rate r, the dividends for the owner or
shareholder of the firm are given by
d = pi − rδγλV − r(1− δγ)λV
= pi − rλV
which reproduces the result (3) above. Thus, even with different cost of obtaining
credit the value of a patent is identical across shareholders and no trade in patents
arises. Labor has to bear the costs for financial leverage completely. Small firms
with high financing costs manage to pay the going wage rate only by reducing their
employment and thereby increasing the marginal productivity of labor which just
outweighs the financing costs.
We can solve the wage equation
w =
wLδ
A˙
A˙
Lδ
= δγλV
A˙
Lδ
= δγλV δ−αAφLλ−1δ (4)
for the demand of labor Lδ to obtain
Lδ =
(
V
w
λδγ−αAφ
) 1
1−λ
. (5)
Remember that low values of δ characterize small firms in our model. If we
associate size with employment, the parameters γ and α must be such that γ−α > 0.
Obviously, the financing constraints for small firms have a negative impact on their
employment.12 Inserting the ideas production function (2) into the wage equation
12For a model that elaborates on the relationship between financial constraints and the firm size
distribution see Cabral and Mata (2003).
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(4) yields:
A˙δ
Lδ
= δ−γ
w
λV
.
Therefore, the innovation intensity, that is, the number of new blue prints relative to
employment, falls with firm size which is in accordance with empirical observations
cited above.
Aggregating individual labor demand (5) over all firms,
∫ 1
δ Lδh(δ)dδ, and equat-
ing the solution with the given labor supply L determines the wage rate:
w = λAφL−(1−λ)V
(
(1 + k)(1− λ)
(1 + k)(1− λ) + γ − α
)1−λ
. (6)
The wages paid to R&D workers decrease with L, which is not surprising. Yet,
they also depends on the distribution of firm sizes captured by the parameter k. As
noted above, a higher k is associated with relatively larger firms and the wage rate
increases with k as long as γ − α is positive, as we assumed above. We note further
that the wage rate is directly proportional to the profit value V . This guarantees
that the growth rate of A is independent of V and hence independent from the not
specified part of the economy13.
To obtain an expression for the growth rate of A, we substitute (6) in (5) and
insert the solution for Lδ into the production function for ideas (2). Integrating over
all firms, A˙ =
∫ 1
δ A˙δh(δ)dδ, yields the desired result:
A˙
A
= λλAφ−1Lλ
(
(1 + k)(1− λ)
(1 + k)(1− λ) + γ − α
)−λ (1 + k)(1− λ)
(1 + k)(1− λ) + λγ − α (7)
There are now opposing forces at work if both γ − α and λγ − α are positive which
implies a value for λ that has not to be too small. On the one hand, a higher k
implies more large scale R&D firms and increasing wages (see equation (6)). This
pulls employment away from small and medium sized companies with a relatively
high innovation intensity. This effect which can be seen in equation (7) by the term
in parentheses is harmful for growth. On the other hand, there is a positive effect of
13Note that our model is distinct in that compared to usual growth models as e.g. Jones (1995).
The reason for this is that we equate the wage paid in R&D with the marginal product in R&D.
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having more large scale firms, if λγ − α > 0. In this case, their advantage through
lower credit costs outweighs the disadvantage from having a lower productivity factor
δ−α in the production function for ideas. This effect is embedded in the rightmost
term of equation (7)
It easily can be verified that the above growth rate has a maximum with respect
to k as long as λγ−α > 0. The growth rate rises with k as long as k is smaller than
k∗ =
(γ − α)(λγ − α)
α(1− λ) − 1.
Of course, the maximum of the growth rate can be obtained by a value for k∗ smaller
than zero which would favor an economy which is biased towards relatively more
small firms.
The results obtained so far are valid at any point in time. We will now obtain
the level of ideas on a balanced growth path of our economy. As usual, we obtain
this path by assuming a constant growth rate of ideas gA := A˙/A. Equation (7)
implies that gA is constant, if the term A
φ−1Lλ does not change over time. This in
turn requires
gA =
λ
1− φgL,
where gL := L˙/L denotes the growth rate of R&D labor supply. The finding that
the economy’s growth rate on a balanced growth path is solely determined by the
(exogenously) given growth rate of labor supply characterizes our model as a second
generation new growth model.14 However, even on the balanced growth path the
distribution of firm size still influences the economy, which can be seen by equating
equation (7) with λ1−φgL and solving for A. This exercise gives the level for the stock
of ideas valid on the balanced growth path
A∗ =
(
λ
1− φgL
)− 1
1−φ
L
λ
1−φ
(
(1 + k)(1− λ)
(1 + k)(1− λ) + γ − α
)− λ
1−φ
×
(
(1 + k)(1− λ)
(1 + k)(1− λ) + λγ − α
) 1
1−φ
.
14Of course, if we assume that gL can be influenced by some policy measure the growth rate is
not exogenous within a more elaborate model.
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From this result we see the implications of growth rates off the balanced growth
path for levels on the balanced growth path. Of course, higher growth rates caused
by an appropriate distribution of firm size manifest themselves in higher levels for
the stock of ideas. The different channels through which this works are the same
as those identified in the discussion of the effects of k on the growth rate of A.
An appropriate distribution fosters growth off the balanced growth path and yields
finally higher levels in ideas on the balanced growth path. As A in usual growth
models influences the level of production of final goods in the economy, this result
is very important.
4 Discussion and Policy Implications
Our model demonstrates that there exists an optimal firm size distribution with
respect to the growth rate of ideas off the balanced growth path and with respect
to the level of ideas on the balanced growth path. Audretsch and Thurik (2001)
already followed these ideas partly in their empirical country study. However, their
approach was not motivated by a detailed (semi-)endogenous growth model. They
rather assumed that there exists an optimal relative number of SMEs by specifying
their empirical model. If a country deviates from this optimum, growth will be
negatively affected.
In the light of the theoretical results above, we must note however, that focusing
on growth rates is not sufficient. As our model predicts growth rates are only affected
by the distribution of firm size off the balanced growth path. On the balanced
growth path the level of production is influenced and not the growth rate. This is
important especially if long time series are considered in an empirical assessment.
In this case we would expect the economy to fluctuate around the balanced growth
path and effects on the growth rate might be hidden away. Therefore levels have to
be considered as well when analyzing the impact of the firm size distribution.
Another point worth mentioning in the light of our results is their relevance in the
political debate. We saw that there is an optimal distribution of firm size captured
by the distribution parameter k. However, the optimal value of k is certainly not
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exogenous. Rather it depends on the model parameters, i.e. λ, α and γ. They
capture the elasticity of innovating with respect to labor in R&D, the comparative
advantage of small firms and lower financial constraints for larger firms. We think
that at least the last two parameters can be influenced by economic policy. The
Basel II agreement is one of the ways through which these parameters might have
been influenced in the past. Concluding this paragraph it might not be necessary
to shift k to its optimal level but it might be also possible to shift the optimal value
towards the existing k.
At this point it is interesting how the transitional growth rate, the steady state
level of ideas A∗ and the optimal k depend on γ and α. Straightforward calculations
reveal that
∂ A˙
A
∂α > 0,
∂A∗
∂α > 0,
∂k∗
∂α < 0,
∂ A˙
A
∂γ < 0,
∂A∗
∂γ < 0,
∂k∗
∂γ > 0.
The results indicate that increasing the comparative advantage for small firms
in innovation , i.e. increasing α, is beneficial for both transitional growth and the
level of ideas on the balanced growth path. Increasing finance costs which hits small
firms hardest due to the chosen formal representation is harmful in both cases.
However, the dependencies of k∗ have exactly the opposite signs. This gives rise
to an interesting mechanism. If k is smaller than k∗, i.e. the economy has more
than optimal small firms, increasing α has a positive direct and indirect effect. The
direct effect works through the increased innovative capacity of smaller firms. The
indirect effect works through lowering k∗ in the direction of the actual k, i.e. the
trade-off between the comparative advantage and disadvantage of smaller firms is
solved more in favor of an economy having a larger SME sector. If, however, k is
larger than k∗, the indirect effect is negative but not strong enough to overcome the
positive direct effect.
Naturally, increasing finance costs or credit constraints which hits smaller firms
hardest leads to exactly the opposite effects. Increasing γ has a negative direct
and indirect effect for an actual k smaller than k∗. If k is small the economy is
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hit hard through increased disadvantage of smaller firms getting financial leverage.
Furthermore, the optimal trade-off solution is shifted towards a larger large firm
sector. For k larger than k∗ the indirect effect has the opposite sign and, hence,
dampens the negative direct effect but does not overcome it.
From this we can draw important policy conclusions. First, policies directed only
towards increasing the SME sector and leaving innovative capacities, α, and credit
constraints unaffected are not always beneficial. There exists an optimal degree of
firm heterogeneity as already conjectured by Audretsch and Thurik (2001). Fostering
the SME too much in that sense is harmful for growth and long run productivity of
the economy.
Second, increasing innovative capacity of firms with a bias towards smaller firms,
i.e. increasing α, is always beneficial for the economy in terms of growth and long-run
productivity. The effect first increases in k15 and then diminishes as k grows large.
The reason for this is that there is a trade-off between increasing the innovative
productivities of SMEs on the one hand, and having to carry the finance costs for
the upcoming ideas.
Third, decreasing credit constraints biased towards SMEs is always beneficial for
growth and long-run productivity. However, the economy benefits most from such a
policy if it is shaped by a large SME sector. The same pattern arises in the case of
an increasing α. Negative capital market shocks that increase γ hit such economies
therefore harder.
A recent review of the EU policy targeted at SMEs can be found in Dannreuther
(2007). The EU tries to promote small businesses since the European Year of the
SME 1982 (EYSME). In 1986 the SME Action Program was launched which ad-
dressed market failures and tried to improve the business environment. The second
phase of SME policy began in the 1990s and was characterized by more sophisti-
cated efforts towards SMEs. The final phase of SME policy started in 2000 with the
Lisbon process. It aims at a stronger coordination of the member countries SME
policies. Through the Lisbon process targets were defined which work as bench-
15See the Appendix at the end of the paper for details.
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marks for evaluating the policy measures. As Dannreuther (2007) points out, the
SME policy of the EU became a very important element of the EU economic policy.
This is also reflected in the Small Business Act of 2008 and the increased role of the
European Investment Bank in financing small businesses (see EC 2010). Also the
responses to the financial crises include specific policies designed for the SME sector.
In Germany the public KfW bank set up special credit programs in collaboration
with private banks for SMEs where the KfW takes over a considerable fraction of
the credit risks. On the European level, the European Investment Bank set up a
credit program directed to SMEs with a volume of 30 b e. EUR over the period
2008 to 2010.
We conclude that even 20 years after the introduction of the first programs at
the European level, promoting SMEs is still an important topic. This seems to
imply that after 20 years the goals have not been reached yet and there is still need
for further policy interventions. However, based on our results there is need for a
careful evaluation of the programs. Their effects on growth and productivity might
be different in different economies, depending on the importance of the SME sector
in the different countries. Drawing again on the SME database of Ayyagari et al.
(2007) shows that the share of SMEs in total employment ranges from a low 56% in
the U.K. and a high of 87% in Greece. Thus, identical policies might have a different
impact in every country with also possibly different signs.
The issue might get even more complex if sector heterogeneity of an economy is
considered. Different sectors of an economy might be characterized by different firm
size distributions. This in turn demands policies that are tailored to these different
sectors. Policies that do not differentiate with respect to that might lead to very
different outcomes across countries as well as across sectors.
5 Conclusion
Given the importance policy gives to fostering the SME sector both at the national
and international level, one may wonder about the justification for doing so. Em-
pirical evidence suggests that there might be a trade-off between SMEs and large
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scale companies defined by innovative capacities and credit constraints. Building on
such a trade-off, our theoretical model suggests an optimal firm heterogeneity with
respect to growth and long run productivity.
Analyzing the results of this model reveals that it might be a good idea to
evaluate the existing policies regarding their appropriateness for the economy to
reach this optimum. Caution might be necessary because the same policies might
have very different impacts across countries. This is especially important considering
harmonized EU wide policies.
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Appendix
Derivatives of A˙A
∂ A˙A
∂α
=
A˙
A
1− λ
(1− λ)(1 + k) + γ(1 + λ)− α
[(1− λ)(1 + k) + γ − α][(1− λ)(1 + k) + λγ − α] > 0 for λγ − α > 0,
∂2 A˙A
∂α∂k
=
A˙
A
−(γλ)2 − [(1− λ)(1 + k) + γ(1 + δ)− α][(1− λ)(1 + k) + γ − α]
[(1− λ)(1 + k) + γ − α]2[(1− λ)(1 + k) + λγ − α]2
+
∂ A˙A
∂α
1
A˙
A
∂ A˙A
∂k
.
The cross derivative with respect to k can be positive or negative. The first term
is always negative for γ − α > 0, the second is positive for k < k∗, zero for k = k∗,
and negative for k > k∗.
∂ A˙A
∂γ
= −A˙
A
λ(1− λ)γ
[(1− λ)(1 + k) + γ − α][(1− λ)(1 + k) + λγ − α] < 0 for λγ − α > 0,
∂2 A˙A
∂γ∂k
=
A˙
A
λ(1− λ)2γ
[(1− λ)(1 + k) + γ − α][(1− λ)(1 + k) + λγ − α]
+
∂ A˙A
∂γ
1
A˙
A
∂ A˙A
∂k
.
Here we observe exactly the opposite behavior compared to the α case above.
Derivatives of k∗
∂k∗
∂α
= −α(1− λ)(λγ − α+ γ − α) + (γ − α)(λγ − α)
α2(1− λ)2 < 0 for λγ − α > 0,
∂k∗
∂γ
=
λ(γ − α)
(1− λ)α > 0.
Thus for k < k∗, increasing α or decreasing γ moves k∗ in the direction of the
existing k.
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